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HOW THE HOLDING IN DENT V. NATIONAL 
FOOTBALL LEAGUE TACKLES COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING AGREEMENTS 
Nairi Dulgarian 
In 2014, a group of retired professional football players sued the Na-
tional Football League (“NFL”), claiming that the league distributed con-
trolled substances and prescription drugs to them in violation of state and 
federal laws.  The trial court ruled that the players’ state law claims are 
preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act 
(“LMRA”), and that the players should instead follow the arbitration proce-
dures set out in the agreed upon collective bargaining agreement.  However, 
the Ninth Circuit reversed the NFL’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that 
the players’ claims are not preempted by section 301.  Ultimately, the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals’ ruling in Dent v. National Football League may 
place the liability of caring for the health and safety of players directly on 
the NFL itself rather than individual teams.  This essentially ignores the pol-
icies set out in the collective bargaining agreement. 
This Comment argues that the Ninth Circuit erroneously reversed the 
trial court’s ruling, because the claims brought against the NFL by the retired 
professional football players should be preempted by section 301 of the 
LMRA.  Furthermore, this Comment argues that the Ninth Circuit’s decision 
interferes with the uniformity of interpretation of collective bargaining 
agreements.  For this reason, the ruling is unfair to not only the league, but 
to other organizations and companies who also rely on collective bargaining 
to negotiate with employees. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the blink of an eye, New England Patriots’ wide receiver Julian Edel-
man saw his season end before it even began.  In a preseason game against 
the Detroit Lions on August 25, 2017, Edelman injured his knee after he 
planted his foot awkwardly and his leg buckled.1  An MRI later confirmed 
that he tore the ACL in his right knee and would miss the entire 2017-2018 
season.2  After having knee surgery shortly thereafter, Edelman, together 
with the Patriots’ team doctors and trainers, began a grueling rehabilitation 
that lasted close to a year.3  His recovery was successful and he returned to 
the field injury free for the start of the 2018-2019 season.4 
For many professional athletes in the United States, however, injuries 
are not properly dealt with.  More often than not, professional athletes are 
left with permanent physical and mental damage after their injuries are either 
improperly treated or go untreated altogether, and are all but forced to resort 
to the courts to resolve these largely avoidable outcomes.5  This was the case 
for Richard Dent (“Dent”) and nine other former football players (collec-
tively the “Plaintiffs”) who brought suit against the National Football League 
(“NFL”) in 2014 based on injuries they suffered while playing.6  Unlike 
Edelman, who received extensive medical care for his injury, Dent and the 
                                                          
1. Jim McBride, Julian Edelman Out for the Season with Knee Injury, BOSTON GLOBE 
(Aug. 26, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/sports/patriots/2017/08/26/patriots-julian-edel-
man-acl-tear-right-knee/NwPwh43JZ8ULYsdexq3tLM/story.html [https://perma.cc/6RJG-
A7RE]. 
2. Id. 
3. Hayden Bird, What Julian Edelman Had to Say About Coming Back from His 2017 Knee 
Injury, BOSTON.COM (Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.boston.com/sports/new-england-patri-
ots/2018/08/03/julian-edelman-injury-rehab-update-2018 [http://archive.is/wx1DL]. 
4. Henry McKenna, Julian Edelman After Returning from ACL Injury: ‘I Feel Like I’m the 
Best Me’, PATRIOTSWIRE (Oct. 5, 2018, 6:30 
AM), https://patriotswire.usatoday.com/2018/10/05/julian-edelman-after-returning-from-acl-
injury-i-feel-like-im-the-best-me/ [https://perma.cc/A2CL-E9RM]. 
5. Dent v. Nat’l Football League, No. C 14-02324 WHA, 2014 WL 7205048, at *1 (N.D. 
Cal. Dec. 17, 2014). 
6. Id. 
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Plaintiffs allege that they were given medications without prescriptions and 
were rushed back to the field before their injuries properly healed.7 
Founded in 1920 as the American Professional Football Association, 
the NFL is an unincorporated association of member clubs that consists of 
thirty-two teams spread out over two conferences.8  Like other professional 
sports, football is a tough, and at times, dangerous sport that can cause inju-
ries.  In order to stay at the top of their game, professional athletes need to 
take good care of their bodies.  At the same time, properly taking care of 
injuries is a necessity that not only needs to be addressed by the athletes 
themselves, it must also be a priority for the NFL and other professional 
sports leagues. 
The NFL has addressed injury related concerns by imposing duties on 
teams in its collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”).  While the NFL “pro-
motes, organizes, and regulates professional football in the United States,” 
players enter into agreements with individual teams, not the NFL itself.9  In 
effect, players are considered employees of the individual teams rather than 
the NFL,10 and the CBA places the responsibility of caring for the health and 
safety of players on the teams and team owners.11  However, the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals’ ruling in Dent v. National Football League, (“Dent v. 
NFL” or “Dent”), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals made a decision that 
may potentially place the burden directly on the NFL—and other organiza-
tions and companies bound by a CBA—effectively ignoring the policies and 
procedures stated in the CBA.12 
On May 20, 2014, Dent and the Plaintiffs filed a putative class action 
suit against the NFL in the Northern District of California alleging that “since 
1969, the NFL has distributed controlled substances and prescription drugs 
                                                          
7. Dent v. Nat’l Football League, No. C 14-02324 WHA, 2014 WL 7205048, at *1 (N.D. 
Cal. Dec. 17, 2014). 
8. Williams v. Nat’l Football League, 582 F.3d 863, 868 (8th Cir. 2009); National Football 
League, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/National-Football-
League [https://perma.cc/SQZ8-U5ST]. 
9. Williams, 582 F.3d at 868. 
10. Dent v. Nat’l Football League, 902 F.3d 1109, 1114 (9th Cir. 2018). 
11. Dent, 2014 WL 7205048, at *4. 
12. See generally Dent v. Nat’l Football League, No. C 14-02324 WHA, 2014 WL 
7205048, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2014). 
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to its players in violation of both state and federal laws.”13  The main issue 
the court considered was whether the state-law claims against the NFL were 
preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act 
(“LMRA”).14  The trial court ruled in favor of the NFL and dismissed the 
case.15  However, after the players appealed the trial court’s decision, the 
Ninth Circuit reversed the NFL’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that the 
players’ claims are not preempted by section 301.16 
This article argues that the Ninth Circuit erred in reversing the trial 
court’s ruling dismissing the players’ case because the claims brought 
against the NFL by former professional football players are, in fact, 
preempted by section 301 of the LMRA.  If the Ninth Circuit’s decision is 
upheld by the United States Supreme Court, provisions in a CBA may be 
rendered useless and employers, such as the NFL, who rely on CBAs to con-
duct their operations will have trouble enforcing its policies.  Part II of this 
Comment discusses the background of the LMRA and explains preemption 
under section 301.  That section also explores the intricacies of the NFL’s 
CBA.  Part III discusses the facts and procedural history of Dent.  Part IV 
provides an analysis of the Ninth Circuit’s decision, explains why the court 
was incorrect in reversing the decision of the trial court, and provides a pos-
sible solution for the players should the Supreme Court reverse the decision 
of the Ninth Circuit in favor of the NFL.  Finally, Part V concludes the article 
by acknowledging the concerns that players have for their health, while rec-
ognizing that section 301 preempts state-law claims that players brought in 
retaliation to the injuries they suffered. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13. Dent, 902 F.3d at 1114–15. 
14. Dent, 2014 WL 7205048, at *1. 
15. See generally id. 
16. See generally Dent, 902 F.3d 1109. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. History of Federal Labor Legislation and Collective Bargaining 
in the United States, and the Enactment of the LMRA 
Beginning in the 1930s, the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) 
governed labor laws in the United States.17  As a result of the economic and 
social consequences of the Great Depression in the 1930s, newly elected 
president Franklin D. Roosevelt introduced a plethora of new government 
programs, including unemployment insurance, job creation, social security, 
and the minimum wage, to help Americans deal with the hardships that many 
people faced during this difficult time.18 This series of government programs 
became known as “The New Deal.”19 
One critical part of Roosevelt’s programs under the New Deal was the 
enactment of the NLRA in 1935.20  The NLRA was the first major piece of 
U.S. labor legislation that gave workers the right to organize, join labor un-
ions, collectively bargain through representatives of their choosing, and 
strike.21  In recognition of the lack of employees’ rights and the exploitation 
of employees by employers, the NLRA “was designed to provide [workers] 
with protection in urging [their] complaints, and to require the employer to 
listen to them and to try fairly to find a mutually acceptable basis for their 
correction. . . .”22 
“The NLRA encouraged collective bargaining and gave employees the 
right to organize themselves into unions by “[setting] standards for union 
elections, and . . . [specifying] unfair labor practices of employers.”23  Its 
                                                          
17. HARRY C. KATZ, THOMAS A. KOCHAN & ALEXANDER J. S. COLVIN, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO U.S. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND LABOR RELATIONS 40 (Cornell University 
Press, ILR Press 2017). 
18. Id.  
19. Id.  
20. Id.  
21. Id.  
22. Edwin A. Elliott, The Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 SW. SOC. SCIENCE 
Q. 107, 109 (1948). 
23. Id. at 40. 
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enactment also indicated “a turn towards collective bargaining as the pre-
ferred method for labor and management”24, allowed workers to form labor 
unions, and required employers to negotiate wages, hours, and working con-
ditions with the unions.25  This provision of the NLRA allowing employees 
to form labor unions was expanded with the enactment of the LMRA, which 
also gave employees the “right to refrain from [organizing and forming labor 
unions] except to the extent that such rights may be affected by an agreement 
requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employ-
ment.”26 
The LMRA was enacted by Congress on June 23, 1947 to “demobilize 
the labor movement by imposing limits on the ability to strike.”27  The pur-
pose of the LMRA was “to prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees 
and employers in their relations. . .[and] to protect the rights of individual 
employees in their relations with labor organizations whose activities affect 
commerce.”28  Additionally, the LMRA “weakened unions and increased the 
employers’ powers to resist organization and collective bargaining”29 by in-
cluding “a series of prohibited union unfair labor practices, an expansion of 
employer ‘free speech’ rights, and a provision for the use of injunctions 
against strikes that imperiled national health and safety.”30 
Overall, the policy of LMRA rests on the assumptions that “[i]ndustrial 
strife. . .can be avoided. . .if employers, employees, and labor organizations 
each recognize under law [] one another’s legitimate rights in their relations 
with each other. . . .”31 
                                                          
24. Id.  
25. Id. at 42.  
26. Id.  
27. Morgan Francy, An Open Field for Professional Athlete Litigation: An Analysis of the 
Current Application of Section 301 Preemption in Professional Sports Lawsuits, 70 SMU L. REV. 
475, 479 (2017).  
28. Id.  
29. Id.  
30. JAMES A. GROSS, RIGHTS, NOT INTERESTS: RESOLVING VALUE CLASHES UNDER THE 
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 25 (Cornell University Press, 2017). 
31. Richard Powers, The Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947: A Topical Digest, 15.1 
S. ECON. J. 67, 67 (1948). 
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B. Section 301 Preemption Under the LMRA 
Collective bargaining agreements typically prevent employees from 
bringing certain tort and contract claims against their employers based on 
section 301 of the LMRA.  Section 301 states that “[s]uits for violation of 
contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing em-
ployees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or be-
tween any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of 
the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the 
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.”32  
The policy behind preemption under section 301 is to encourage “uniformity 
of interpretation of collective bargaining agreements and prevention of in-
terference with those agreements[,]”33 as well as “to promote the peaceable, 
consistent resolution of labor-management disputes.”34 
Preemption under the LMRA is different from preemption under the 
Constitution of the United States because “it is not driven by substantive 
conflicts in law.”35  Under Article VI, Clause 2 of the Constitution, the laws 
of the United States “shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . any Thing in 
the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding.”36  
Based on this clause, “courts have long recognized that state laws that con-
flict with federal law are ‘without effect.’”37  Therefore, under Article VI, 
Clause 2 of the Constitution, any state-law claim is “preempted” if it con-
flicts with a federal law.  LMRA preemption instead is “grounded in the need 
to protect the proper forum for resolving certain kinds of disputes and, by 
extension, the substantive law applied thereto.”38 
While “Congress has declined to explicitly state whether it intended for 
[section] 301 to preempt state-law claims,” section 301 “has long been inter-
preted as ousting state-law claims for breach of contract when the contract 
                                                          
32. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2006). 
33. Francy, supra note 27, at 479. 
34. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 404 (1988). 
35. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Schurke, 898 F.3d 904, 922 (9th Cir. 2018). 
36. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
37. Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008). 
38. Alaska Airlines Inc., 898 F.3d at 943. 
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involved is a collective bargaining agreement.”39  Additionally, “[w]hen res-
olution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the 
terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract, that 
claim must either be treated as a [section] 301 claim or dismissed as 
preempted by federal labor-contract law.”40  However, in Cramer v. Consol-
idated Freightways, Inc., the court emphasized that section 301 does not 
grant the parties to a CBA the ability to contract for illegal activities.41 
In addition to the preemption for breach of contract claims, the court in 
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck (“Lueck”) discussed section 301 preemption 
of tort-law claims.  In Lueck, the court explained how “the preemptive effect 
of [section] 301 must extend beyond suits alleging contract violations[,]” and 
that “questions relating to what the parties to a labor agreement agreed, and 
what legal consequences were intended to flow from breaches of that agree-
ment, must be resolved by reference to uniform federal law, whether such 
questions arise in the context of a suit for breach of contract or in a suit al-
leging liability in tort.”42  The court explained that if this were not the case, 
parties would avoid the requirements of section 301 by claiming that their 
breach of contract claims are claims for tort-law claims.43 
1. The Test for Section 301 Preemption 
Lower courts have created the following two-step test to define 
preemption under section 301.  First, does the cause of action involve “rights 
conferred upon an employee by virtue of state-law [and] not by a CBA?”44  
If these rights “exist solely as a result of the CBA, then the claim is 
                                                          
39. Kelly A. Heard, The Impact of Preemption in the NFL Concussion Litigation, 68 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 221, 227 (2013).  
40. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985).  
41. Cramer v. Consol. Freightways, Inc., 255 F.3d 683, 695 (9th Cir. 2001). 
42. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 471 U.S. at 210–11.  
43. Id.  
44. Burnside v. Kiewit Pac. Corp., 491 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2007).  
DULGARIAN1 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/11/2019  11:06 AM 
2019] DENT V. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE 213 
preempted, and [the] analysis ends there.”45  However, if the right exists in-
dependently of the CBA, the question becomes whether it is “substantially 
dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement.”46   
To determine whether a claim requires interpretation of a CBA, a 
“case-by-case analysis of the state-law claim as it relates to the CBA” is re-
quired.47  Additionally, those claims “must be analyzed as they relate to the 
CBAs under which the Players played.’”48  As the court in Dent explained: 
If the plaintiff’s claim cannot be resolved without interpreting the 
applicable CBA . . . it is preempted. Alternatively, if the claim 
may be litigated without reference to the rights and duties estab-
lished in a CBA . . . it is not preempted. The plaintiff’s claim is 
the touchstone for this analysis; the need to interpret the CBA 
must inhere in the nature of the plaintiff’s claim . . . A state-law 
claim is not preempted under [Section] 301 unless it necessarily 
requires the court to interpret an existing provision of a CBA that 
can reasonably be said to be relevant to the resolution of the dis-
pute.49 
A defendant cannot invoke preemption “simply because the defendant 
refers to the CBA in mounting a defense,”50 and a preemption argument is 
not credible “simply because the court may have to consult the CBA to eval-
uate.”51  To prevail on a defense of preemption, “the proffered interpretation 
argument must reach a reasonable level of credibility.”52  Generally, if the 
plaintiffs use this two-step test to prove that their state-law claims should be 
                                                          
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
47. Michael Telis, Playing Through the Haze: The NFL Concussion Litigation and Section 
301 Preemption, 102 GEO. L.J. 1841, 1855 (2014). 
48. Id. 
49. Dent v. Nat’l Football League, No. C 14-02324 WHA, 2014 WL 7205048, at *3 (N.D. 
Cal. Dec. 17, 2014). 
50. Cramer, 255 F.3d at 691. 
51. Id. at 692. 
52. Id. 
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preempted, then the “claims will be dismissed and must be pursued through 
the grievance procedure set out in the controlling CBA . . . .”53 
2. Significant Cases Prior to Dent v. NFL 
Recent cases similar to Dent demonstrate how section 301 has been 
interpreted by lower courts.  As the outcomes of the following cases and the 
broadness of the test indicate, preemption under section 301 has been applied 
several times in cases involving the NFL or NFL teams.  Courts have en-
couraged preemption,54 as all but two of these recent cases have favored it 
and concluded that plaintiffs must adhere to the provisions set in the CBA. 
a. Evans v. Arizona Cardinals Football Club 
In Evans v. Arizona Cardinals Football Club (“Evans”), the plaintiffs, 
retired NFL players sued the thirty-two individual NFL teams, rather than 
the NFL itself, challenging the administration of painkiller drugs.55  The de-
fendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the claims against them are 
preempted by section 301 and barred by the statute of limitations because the 
thirteen named plaintiffs were retired.56  Moreover, the plaintiffs allege that 
the teams made intentional misrepresentations to them in violation of the 
Controlled Substances Act and the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.57  How-
ever, a CBA cannot sanction the illegal distribution of medications in viola-
tion of these statutes.58  Therefore, the terms of the CBA need not be con-
strued and the “prohibition against such conduct stood independently from 
any CBA.”59 
                                                          
53. Francy, supra note 27, at 477–78.  
54. Cramer, 255 F.3d at 690.  
55. Evans v. Arizona Cardinals Football Club, LLC, No. CV WMN-15-1457, 2016 WL 
759208, at *2 (D. Md. Feb. 25, 2016); Evans v. Arizona Cardinals Football Club LLC, No. C 16-
01030 WHA, 2016 WL 3566945, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2016).  
56. Id. at *1.  
57. Id.  
58. Id.  
59. Id.  
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Because the claims were directed at the individual teams, the court con-
cluded that the claims for relief were grounded in illegal conduct in the 
teams’ violation of state statutes, and denied the defendants’ motion to dis-
miss.60  Although the players retired years before filing the lawsuit, the 
teams’ motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations was denied be-
cause “the nature of at least some of the injuries was latent and slow in de-
veloping.”61 
b.  Duerson v. National Football League, Inc. 
Duerson v. National Football League, Inc. (“Duerson”) was about Da-
vid Duerson, an NFL player for ten years who later committed suicide.62  
Three months after his suicide, doctors examined his brain and he was diag-
nosed with chronic traumatic encephalopathy.63  Duerson’s estate sued the 
NFL in state court for wrongful death, alleging that Duerson’s suicide was a 
result of the brain damage he suffered while playing in the NFL.64  The NFL 
sought to remove the case to federal court, arguing that the state-law wrong-
ful death claim was preempted by section 301 because it was “substantially 
dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the 
parties in a labor contract.”65  The court agreed, stating that it would “need 
to determine whether Duerson’s concussive brain trauma was ‘significantly 
aggravated,’ within the meaning of the CBA provision, by continuing to 
play.”66  Additionally, the court concluded that even though the CBA only 
imposed duties on the NFL teams, not the NFL itself, it would have to inter-
pret the CBA to determine whether the NFL’s duty was triggered.67 
                                                          
60. Id.  
61. Id.  
62. Duerson v. Nat’l Football League, Inc., No. 12 C 2513, 2012 WL 1658353, at *1 (N.D. 
Ill. May 11, 2012).  
63. Id.  
64. Id.  
65. Id. at *2.  
66. Id. at *4.  
67. Id. at *10.  
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c. Stringer v. National Football League 
In the events leading up to Stringer v. National Football League 
(“Stringer”), NFL player Korey Stringer died of heat exhaustion and heat-
stroke during the preseason.68  As a result, his widow sued (1) the NFL, (2) 
the California corporation responsible for approving, licensing, and promot-
ing equipment used by NFL teams, and (3) the Minnesota Vikings’ team 
physician in state court for negligence.69  The NFL contended that the CBA, 
entered into by the National Football League Management Council and the 
National Football League Players Association, is the only logical source of 
the duties allegedly breached.70  In addition, the NFL argued that resolution 
of the plaintiff’s claims would require interpretation of the terms of the CBA 
because the claims present disputes over “working conditions.”71   
In response, the plaintiff argued that her claims were not preempted 
“because they were based solely on common law tort principles and could 
be resolved without interpreting any provisions of the CBA.”72  The court 
found that the plaintiff’s claims do not arise from the CBA, yet resolution of 
her claim requires interpretation of the terms of the CBA and is intertwined 
with it.73 
Another significant issue decided in Stringer was whether non-signa-
tories to a CBA can invoke section 301 preemption as a defense to a plain-
tiff’s state-law claims.74  Citing to several cases, the court found that the 
“[d]efendants’ status as non-signatories to the CBA does not prevent them 
from raising the preemption defense.”75 
                                                          
68. Stringer v. Nat’l Football League, 474 F. Supp. 2d 894, 898 (S.D. Ohio 2007).  
69. Id.  
70. Id. at 901.  
71. Id. at 900–01.  
72. Id. at 901.  
73. Id. at 908.  
74. Id. at 901–02.  
75. Id. at 902.  
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d. Holmes v. National Football League 
In Holmes v. National Football League (“Holmes”), an NFL player was 
suspended for four games after he tested positive for a drug test given to him 
by the Detroit Lions pursuant to the NFL’s drug testing program established 
by the CBA.76  The player sued, alleging that the imposed punishment man-
dated by the NFL CBA violated his due process rights.77  The court held that 
the labor dispute regarding the propriety of Holmes’ enrollment in the drug 
program could not be separated from his state tort and contract claims, and 
the claims were preempted by the LMRA.78 
e. Williams v. National Football League 
In Williams v. National Football League (“Williams”), several football 
players sued the NFL for fraud, negligence, and negligent misrepresentation 
after they were suspended for testing positive for a banned substance found 
in the dietary supplements they took.79  The players argued that the NFL had 
duty, separate from the CBA, to provide the players “[an] ingredient-specific 
warning” for the dietary supplements.80 
The court concluded that “whether the NFL . . . owed the Players a duty 
to provide such a warning cannot be determined without examining the par-
ties’ legal relationship and expectations as established by the CBA and the 
[collectively bargained NFL Policy on Anabolic Steroids and Related Sub-
stances].”81  This prevents NFL players from using certain substances and 
“adopts a rule of strict liability under which ‘[p]layers are responsible for 
what is in their bodies.’’’82  Therefore, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the 
players’ claims for fraud, constructive fraud, and negligent misrepresenta-
tion were preempted by section 301 because the claims “relating to what the 
                                                          
76. Holmes v. Nat’l Football League, 939 F. Supp. 517, 520 (N.D. Tex. 1996).  
77. Id. at 522.  
78. Id. at 527.  
79. Williams v. Nat’l Football League, 582 F.3d 863, 880–81 (8th Cir. 2009).  
80. Id. at 881.  
81. Id.  
82. Id. at 868.  
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parties to a labor agreement agreed. . .must be resolved by reference to uni-
form federal law.”83  However, they also concluded that the players’ claims 
under the Minnesota Consumable Products Act and the Minnesota Drug and 
Alcohol Testing in the Workplace Act were not preempted by the LMRA 
because they did not require interpreting and applying the provisions of the 
NFL’s drug testing program.84 
C. The NFL’s Collective Bargaining Agreements 
The NLRA states that “[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organi-
zation, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively 
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted 
activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or pro-
tection.”85  Additionally, Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA prohibits employers 
from refusing to engage in collective bargaining with employee representa-
tives,86  ensuring that employers negotiate in good faith.87 
Since 1968, the NFL, its individual teams, and NFL players have been 
bound by a series of CBAs.88  The current CBA went into effect on August 
4, 2011, and extends through 2020.89  The NFL is not a party to this CBA; 
instead, it is negotiated by the NFL Players Association (“NFLPA”) (the 
players’ bargaining unit) and the NFL Management Council (the teams’ bar-
gaining unit).90 
                                                          
83. Id.  
84. Id. at 878.  
85. National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, 452 § 7 (1935).  
86. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982).  
87. Noel M.B. Hensley & John V. Jansonius, The Interaction of Federal Labor and Anti-
trust Policies:  An Analysis of the Legality of Coordinated Collective Bargaining by Employers, 40 
SW. L.J. 967, 973 (1986).  
88. Francy, supra note 27, at 482.  
89. Collective Bargaining Agreement Between the NFL Management Council and the NFL 
Players Association, NFL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION 1, 1 (Aug. 4, 2011), 
https://nflpaweb.blob.core.windows.net/media/De-
fault/PDFs/2011%20CBA%20Updated%20with%20Side%20Letters%20thru%201-5-15.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8UXP-PK8K].  
90. Dent v. Nat’l Football League, 902 F.3d 1109, 1114 (9th Cir. 2018).  
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Before CBAs governed professional sports, team owners insisted that 
players were not employees, and therefore were not protected under the 
NLRA.91  However, the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”), created 
when Congress passed the NLRA in 1935, changed this, which lead to labor 
disputes between players and owners in professional sports leagues, includ-
ing the NFL.92  In 1956, the NFLPA was created, but despite its existence, a 
CBA was not actually in place between the players and owners.93  Instead, 
some players resorted to hiring their own agents to negotiate contractual 
terms and provisions.94  The first CBA was agreed upon in 1968,95 after the 
merger of the NFL and the American Football League.96  Since then, CBAs 
have changed and developed over time, with negotiations continuing to be 
held between the NFLPA and the NFL Management Council. 
In regard to players’ health, CBAs have included provisions concerning 
players’ rights to medical care and treatment since 1982.97  Generally, these 
provisions have required teams to employ “a board-certified orthopedic sur-
geon as one of its club physicians,” and that “all other physicians retained by 
a Club to treat players shall be board-certified in their field of medical ex-
pertise.”98  In addition, players are “guaranteed . . . the right to access their 
medical records, obtain second opinions, and choose their own surgeons.”99 
                                                          
91. Michael Lydakis & Andrew Zapata, Tackling the Issues: The History of the National 
Football League’s 2011 Collective Bargaining Agreement and What it Means for the Future of the 
Sport, 10 WILLAMETTE SPORTS L.J. 17, 17–18 (2012).  
92. Id. at 18.  
93. C. P. Goplerud III, Collective Bargaining in the National Football League: A Historical 
and Comparative Analysis, 4 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 13, 14 (1997).  
94. Id.  
95. Lydakis & Zapata, supra note 91, at 18.  
96. Id.  
97. Dent, 902 F.3d at 1114.  
98. NFL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, supra note 89, at 171.  
99. Id.  
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There are also several provisions in the CBA that specifically address 
player health and safety.100  For example, the 1982 CBA established that “[i]f 
a Club physician advise[s] a coach or other Club representative of a player’s 
physical condition which could adversely affect the player’s performance or 
health, the physician [shall] also advise the player.”101  In addition, the 1993 
CBA added the requirement that “[i]f such condition could be significantly 
aggravated by continued performance, the physician [shall] advise the player 
of such fact in writing.”102  Finally, the 2011 CBA established that team phy-
sicians “are required to disclose to a player any and all information about the 
player’s physical condition” that the physicians disclose to coaches or other 
team representatives, “whether or not such information affects the player’s 
performance or health.’”103 
III. DENT V. NFL LAWSUIT 
A. Factual and Procedural Background 
On May 20, 2014, Dent and Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in the Northern 
District of California against the NFL, seeking class action status for more 
than 1,000 former players who received narcotic painkillers, anti-inflamma-
tories, local anesthetics, sleeping aids, or other drugs without prescription, 
independent diagnosis, or warnings about the side effects and dangers of 
mixing with other drugs.104  They contend that the way the drugs were dis-
tributed left them with severe, long-term injuries.105  The plaintiffs asserted 
nine claims: (1) declaratory relief, (2) medical monitoring, (3) fraud, (4) 
fraudulent concealment, (5) negligent misrepresentation, (6) negligence per 
se, (7) loss of consortium on behalf of class members’ spouses, (8) negligent 
                                                          
100. Kelly A. Heard, The Impact of Preemption in the NFL Concussion Litigation, 68 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 221, 235 (2013).  
101. Dent, 902 F.3d at 1114.  
102. Id.  
103. NFL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, supra note 89, at 175.  
104. Dent v. Nat’l Football League, 902 F.3d 1109, 1115 (9th Cir. 2018); Ex-Players: NFL 
Illegally Used Drugs, ESPN (May 22, 2014), http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/10958191/nfl-
illegally-supplied-risky-painkilling-drugs-former-players-allege-suit [https://perma.cc/QHK7-
CMFM].  
105. Dent, 902 F.3d at 1115.  
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hiring of medical personnel, and (9) negligent retention of medical person-
nel.106  They sought punitive damages, injunctive relief, declaratory relief, 
and medical monitoring.107 
Plaintiffs allege that since 1969 doctors and trainers from NFL teams 
have supplied injured players with different pain medications that allow 
them to effectively return to the field rather than allowing them to rest and 
heal properly from football-related injuries.108  The medications were given 
without prescriptions, without consulting the players’ medical history, and 
in ways that violated both federal laws and the American Medical Associa-
tion’s Code of Ethics.109 
Dent is a NFL Hall of Fame defensive player who claims that through-
out his fourteen-year career on four different teams, team doctors and train-
ers gave him “hundreds, if not thousands” of injections and pills that con-
tained painkillers to keep him on the field, rather than allowing his injuries 
to heal.110  According to Dent, he was never warned about the potential side 
effects or long-term risks of the medications he was given, and he ended his 
career with an enlarged heart, permanent nerve damage in his foot, and an 
addiction to painkillers.111 
Among others, Plaintiffs also include members of the NFL champion 
1985 Chicago Bears: Offensive Lineman Keith Van Horne, and Quarter-
back Jim McMahon.112  Similar to Dent, Horne and McMahon allege that 
during their time in the NFL, they were given opioids, non-steroidal anti-
inflammatory medications, and local anesthetics without prescriptions.113  
They also allege that “the NFL encouraged players to take these pain-mask-
ing medications to keep players on the field and revenues high, even [though] 
                                                          
106. Id.  
107. Id.  
108. Dent v. Nat’l Football League, No. C 14-02324 WHA, 2014 WL 7205048, at *1 (N.D. 
Cal. Dec. 17, 2014).  
109. Id. at *2.  
110. Dent, 902 F.3d at 1114.  
111. Id.  
112. ESPN, supra note 104.  
113. Dent, 902 F.3d at 1115.  
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the football season [grew] longer and the time between games [became] 
shorter . . . .”114   
According to the players, they “rarely, if ever, received written pre-
scriptions. . .for the medications they were receiving,” and instead were 
handed pills in “small manila envelopes that often had no directions or label-
ing” and were told to take whatever was in the envelopes.115  They further 
allege that during their years of taking these medications, doctors and train-
ers never warned them about “potential side effects, long-term risks, interac-
tions with other drugs, or the likelihood of addiction.”116  As a result, the 
plaintiffs claim to suffer from permanent orthopedic injuries, drug addic-
tions, heart problems, nerve damage, and renal failure.117 
B. Trial Court Rulings 
In response to the plaintiffs’ suit, the NFL filed two motions to dis-
miss.118  First, the NFL argued that the players’ claims are preempted by 
section 301 of the LMRA.119  Second, the NFL argued that the players not 
only failed to state a claim, but also that their claims were time-barred under 
the statute of limitations.120 
Following an initial hearing on November 6, 2014, the trial court sub-
mitted a series of requests for an additional briefing before granting the 
NFL’s motion to dismiss under section 301.121  In doing so, the court outlined 
preemption under section 301 following the two-step test described above in 
Part II.B.  It then explained how the essence of the plaintiffs’ claim of relief 
                                                          
114. Id.  
115. Id.  
116. Id.  
117. Id. at 1114.  
118. Dent, 2014 WL 7205048, at *2.  
119. Id.  
120. Dent, 902 F.3d at 1115–16.  
121. Dent, 2014 WL 7205048, at *6.  
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is that the “individual clubs mistreated their players and the league was neg-
ligent in failing to intervene and stop their alleged mistreatment.”122 
While the CBA does not conflict with the common law theories of the 
complaint, the court concluded that the players’ state-law claims are 
preempted by section 301 because litigating the state-law claim would re-
quire interpreting the CBA between the league and the NFLPA.123  The court 
came to this conclusion because “it would be necessary to consider the ways 
in which the NFL has indeed stepped forward and required proper medical 
care–which here prominently included imposing specific CBA medical du-
ties on the clubs.”124  In one set of findings for the preemption of negligence-
based claims, the court described several provisions in different CBAs and 
the steps the NFL has taken to address the issue of medical care by imposing 
duties on individual teams: 
As demonstrated by the scope and development of these provi-
sions, this is not a situation in which the NFL has stood by and 
done nothing. The union and the league have bargained exten-
sively over the subject of player medical care for decades. While 
these protections do not specifically call out the prescribing of 
drugs and painkillers, they address more generally medical care, 
player health, and recovery time, and proper administration of 
drugs can reasonably be deemed to fall under these more general 
protections. Put differently, the right to medical care established 
by the CBAs, moreover, presumably included and still includes 
proper medical care in accordance with professional standards – 
including for the administration of drugs and painkillers – or at 
least a fair question of interpretation in that regard is posed.125 
 
For example, the plaintiffs’ negligent hiring and negligent retention 
claims allege that the NFL “had a duty to ‘hire and retain educationally well-
qualified, medically-competent professionally-objective and specifically-
                                                          
122. Id. at *10–11.  
123. Id. at *23.  
124. Id.  
125. Id. at *19–20.  
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trained professionals not subject to any conflicts.’”126  The court explained 
how the NFL and NFLPA addressed this duty in the CBA by requiring each 
club to hire physicians that are “board-certified in their field of medical ex-
pertise.”127   
The plaintiffs also argued that because they sued the NFL directly and 
did not sue any of the individual teams, team doctors or trainers, “the inter-
pretation of CBA provisions relating to the individual clubs are unnecessary 
for resolving the plaintiffs’. . .claims against the league.”128  In response, the 
trial court stated that “[t]he nub of plaintiffs’ claims is that the NFL is re-
sponsible for, and acts through, the clubs’ medical staffs,” and “[t]o deter-
mine what the scope of this supervisory duty was, and whether the NFL 
breached it, the Court would need to determine, to repeat, what the NFL, 
through the CBAs, required of the individual club and club physicians.”129  
Therefore, the court concluded that it would be necessary to interpret the 
CBA, and that the plaintiffs’ claims are preempted by section 301.130 
The court also concluded that it was necessary to interpret the CBA for 
the plaintiffs’ fraud-based claims and claims for declaratory relief, medical 
monitoring, and loss of consortium on behalf of the putative class members’ 
spouses.131  The players timely appealed the trial court’s decision to the Ninth 
Circuit, which reversed the trial court’s decision.132 
C. Reasoning of the Ninth Circuit 
The Ninth Circuit, like the trial court, used the two-step test to deter-
mine whether the plaintiff’s state-law claims were preempted by sec-
tion 301.133  However, the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning differed from the trial 
court’s interpretation of the players’ claims.  The trial court stated that “the 
                                                          
126. Id. at *21.  
127. Dent, 2014 WL 7205048, at *16.  
128. Id. at *23.  
129. Id. at *24.  
130. Id. at *39.  
131. Dent, 2014 WL 7205048, at *38.  
132. Dent, 902 F.3d at 1113–14.  
133. Id. at 1116.  
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‘essence’ of the plaintiffs’ negligence claim ‘is that the individual clubs mis-
treated their players and the league was negligent in failing to intervene and 
stop their alleged mistreatment.’”134  Unlike the trial court, however, the 
Ninth Circuit concluded that the players’ claims do not comprise a dispute 
over the rights created by the CBA.135  Instead, their claims involve whether 
or not the NFL itself, not the individual teams, provided players with pre-
scription drugs.136 
Here, the Ninth Circuit concluded that because the players are suing 
the NFL and not the individual teams, the players’ claims “do not constitute 
a dispute over the rights created by, or the meaning of, the CBAs.”137 Addi-
tionally, the court emphasized that “[t]heir claim is that when the NFL pro-
vided players with prescription drugs, it engaged in conduct that was com-
pletely outside the scope of the CBA[].”138  This is similar to the reasoning 
used in Evans, where the court concluded that the claims for relief were 
grounded in illegal conduct in violation of statutes by the clubs.139  The Ninth 
Circuit contradicted the trial court’s reasoning by claiming that 
“the teams’ obligations under the CBA[] are irrelevant to the question of 
whether the NFL breached an obligation to players by violating the law.”140 
Furthermore, the court held that the fact that the CBA has provisions ad-
dressing players’ injuries and medical conditions “does not address 
the NFL’s liability for injuring players by illegally distributing prescription 
drugs.”141  Consequently, the Ninth Circuit conducted the analysis with this 
reasoning in mind. 
Therefore, largely because the provisions in the CBA does not directly 
address the NFL itself, the Ninth Circuit concluded that “no interpretation of 
the terms of the CBA[] is necessary, and there is no danger that a court will 
                                                          
134. Id. at 1118.  
135. Id. at 1123.  
136. Id.  
137. Dent, 902 F.3d at 1126.  
138. Id.  
139. Evans v. Arizona Cardinals Football Club LLC, No. C 16-01030 WHA, 2016 WL 
3566945, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2016).  
140. Id. at 1121.  
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impermissibly invade the province of the labor arbitrator.”142  In addition, 
the court clarified that “[m]erely consulting a CBA…does not constitute ‘in-
terpretation’ of the CBA for preemption purposes.”143  Instead, the court 
stated that it should “. . .compare the NFL’s conduct with the requirements 
of state and federal laws governing the distribution of prescription drugs.”144 
 
IV. ANALYSIS OF NINTH CIRCUIT’S RULING OF DENT V. 
NFL 
A. Contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s Ruling, Federal Preemption of 
the Players’ State-Law Claims was Warranted 
The Ninth Circuit erroneously reversed the trial court’s decision to 
grant the NFL’s motion to dismiss, for two reasons.  First, in accordance with 
the two-step test described above, the plaintiffs’ claims are preempted by 
section 301.  Second, the Ninth Circuit’s holding interferes with the uni-
formity of interpretation of CBAs.  For these reasons, the players’ claims 
should have been preempted by section 301 and the lower court’s decision 
should not have been reversed.  Furthermore, if their claims are preempted 
by section 301, the plaintiffs still have recourse through the arbitration pro-
cedures defined in the CBA. 
1. Federal Preemption of the Plaintiffs’ Claims was Warranted 
Because They Adhere to the Two-Step Test for Section 301 
Preemption 
As mentioned above in Part II.B.1, the following questions are asked 
when determining whether employees’ claims are preempted by section 301: 
first, does the cause of action involve “rights conferred upon an employee by 
virtue of state law [and] not by a CBA?”145  If the rights at issue arise from 
                                                          
142. Id. at 1126.  
143. Id. at 1117.  
144. Id. at 1120.  
145. Burnside v. Kiewit Pac. Corp., 491 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2007).  
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the CBA, then the claim is preempted, and the analysis ends there.146  Sec-
ond, if the rights do not arise from the CBA, does “litigating the state law 
claim nonetheless require interpretation of a CBA?”147  Here, the plaintiffs’ 
claims should be preempted by section 301 because the claims either arise 
from the NFL CBAs, or required the interpretation of them. 
a. The Players’ Claims Arise from the CBAs 
The first question asks whether the rights at issue arise from the 
CBA.148  If the claim at issue is not a relevant issue in the CBA, then it is not 
considered to arise from the CBA.149  For example, in McPherson v. Tenn. 
Football Inc. (“McPherson”), a player brought a negligence claim against 
the Tennessee Titans after he was hit by a mascot in a golf cart during 
halftime.150  The court held that the player’s claim was not preempted be-
cause there were no provisions in the CBA “concerning its mascots or field 
safety for half-time activities.”151  In contrast, the court in Holmes, where an 
NFL player was suspended for failing a drug test, concluded that the player’s 
claims were preempted by section 301 because the CBA contained a provi-
sion with an established drug testing program.152 
Here, there are CBA provisions directly applicable to the relevant 
claim.  Regarding the players’ negligence claims, the Ninth Circuit analyzed 
each claim and concluded that “the players’ right to receive medical care 
from the NFL that does not create an unreasonable risk of harm” does not 
arise from the CBA.153  Unlike the district court, the Ninth Circuit concluded 
that the players’ claims do not arise from the CBA because the NFL engaged 
                                                          
146. Id.  
147. Id.  
148. Dent v. Nat’l Football League, 902 F.3d 1109, 1118 (9th Cir. 2018).  
149. Duerson v. Nat’l Football League, Inc., No. 12 C 2513, 2012 WL 1658353, at *5 (N.D. 
Ill. May 11, 2012).  
150. McPherson v. Tenn. Football Inc., No. 07CV00002, 2007 WL 803970, at *5 (M.D. 
Tenn. Jan. 3, 2007); Duerson, 2012 WL 1658353, at *5.  
151. Duerson, 2012 WL 1658353, at *5 (citation omitted).  
152. Holmes v. Nat’l Football League, 939 F. Supp. 517, 524 (N.D. Tex. 1996).  
153. Dent, 902 F.3d at 1118.  
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in conduct outside the scope of the CBA.154  However, there are several pro-
visions in the CBA that address player health and safety.  Unlike the situation 
in McPherson, where the CBA had no relevant provisions regarding mascots 
and field safety during halftime,155 current and past CBAs clearly state the 
numerous duties that the league has imposed on the individual clubs.  For 
example, the 1980 CBA imposed a process for club physicians to document 
expected player recovery time with the following provision: “[a]ll determi-
nations of recovery time for major and minor injuries must be by the Club’s 
medical staff and in accordance with the Club’s medical standards. . .The 
prognosis of the player’s recovery time should be as precise as possible.”156  
The 1982 CBA imposed other requirements on clubs regarding chemical 
abuse and dependency by including a provision that “[t]he Club physician 
may, upon reasonable cause, direct a player. . .for testing for chemical abuse 
or dependency problems.”157 
The retired players may again argue, as Judge Kozinski of the Ninth 
Circuit concluded, that the CBAs exempt the NFL because “the league is not 
a signatory on six of the seven [CBAs].”158  “Judge Kozinski compared the 
NFL to a random third party, such as a player’s wife who instructs a team 
doctor to give her husband more pain medication.”159  The players allege that 
the NFL doctors and trainers, not the doctors and trainers of individual teams, 
gave players medications without telling them what they were taking.  There-
fore, because the CBA only address the duties of the individual clubs and not 
the NFL itself, the plaintiffs will continue to argue that their claims do not 
arise from the CBA, nor do they require interpretation from the CBA.  How-
ever, regardless of whether or not the NFL is a signatory to the contracts, the 
league is still heavily involved in the agreements, unlike a player’s wife, and 
is not just “a random third party.”  As a result, the CBA should not exempt 
                                                          
154. Id. at 1126.  
155. Duerson, 2012 WL 1658353, at *5.  
156. Dent v. Nat’l Football League, No. C 14-02324 WHA, 2014 WL 7205048, at *4–5 
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the NFL and the players’ claims do arise from the CBA.  Additionally, as 
discussed before, the court in Stringer found that “[d]efendants’ status as 
non-signatories to the CBA does not prevent them from raising the preemp-
tion defense.”160  For these reasons, the fact that the NFL is not a signatory 
to several of the CBAs does not stop it from using this defense.161 
The players’ and Ninth Circuit’s reasoning that the CBA provisions 
governing players’ right to medical care is “irrelevant to the question of 
whether the NFL’s conduct violated federal laws regarding the distribution 
of controlled substances”162 is incorrect.  There are several provisions in the 
CBAs that address these issues.  For example, the 1993 CBA imposed a right 
to medical care for injuries and placed the scope of such care in the hands of 
club physicians.163 The 2006 CBA provided that each club will have a board-
certified orthopedic surgeon as one of its Club physicians,164 and the 2011 
CBA expanded on this by requiring all other physicians to be board-certified 
in their field of expertise.165  In addition, the 2011 CBA clarified that “club 
physicians must comply with all federal, state, and local requirements, in-
cluding all ethical standards established by any applicable government 
and/or other authority that regulates the medical profession.”166 
Additionally, if the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation prevails and the play-
ers’ claims are not preempted solely because the CBA addresses the duties 
of the individual teams rather than the NFL, it would show that “the NFL 
could reasonably rely on the [individual teams] to notice and diagnose player 
                                                          
160. Stringer v. Nat’l Football League, 474 F. Supp. 2d 894, 902 (S.D. Ohio 2007).  
161. Article 2, Section 1 of the 2011 CBA states that “[f]or the avoidance of doubt, the 
NFL shall be considered a signatory to this Agreement.”  However, this provision is not included 
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162. Dent, 902 F.3d at 1126.  
163. Dent, 2014 WL 7205048, at *5.  
164. Collective Bargaining Agreement Between the NFL Management Council and the 
NFL Players Association, NFL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION 1, 197 (Aug. 4, 2011), 
https://nflpaweb.blob.core.windows.net/media/De-
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health problems arising from playing in the NFL.”167  The NFL could then 
exercise a lower standard of care, potentially leading to more problems re-
garding the health and safety of players. Therefore, determining the meaning 
of the CBA provisions is necessary to resolving these claims. 
It is evident that the NFL has produced multiple provisions from the 
CBA that explicitly address player health and safety and “address in detail 
issues relating to assessment, diagnosis, and treatment of player injuries.”168  
These player health and safety provisions place responsibility on team doc-
tors, through the NFL, “to determine a player’s physical condition and re-
covery time; medical and hospital care for the player after suffering an injury 
while performing services under the contract; team requirements for board-
certified orthopedic surgeons; trainer certification by the National Athletic 
Trainers Association; and additional doctors and an ambulance on site during 
games.”169 
Because the players’ claims are relevant and related to several provi-
sions in the CBA, the court would have to consider the protections in the 
prior paragraph that the NFL has imposed on clubs through collective bar-
gaining.  Therefore, the players’ claims arise from the CBA.  If the claims 
arise from the CBA, the claim is preempted, and the analysis stops here.170  
However, even if the Ninth Circuit correctly determined that the plaintiffs’ 
claims did not arise from the CBA, still, it erroneously concluded that they 
would not require the interpretation of the CBA. 
b. Even if the Players’ Claims Did Not Arise from the CBA, They 
Would Still Require the Interpretation of the CBAs 
If the players’ claims do not arise from the CBA, then the second ques-
tion is whether the claims require interpretation from the CBA.  Even if the 
players’ claims arose from common law or state law rather than the CBA, 
the claims would still be preempted under the second step of the test because 
they require interpretation of the CBA.  The situation in Dent is similar to 
the situation in Stringer, in that the court was faced with determining whether 
                                                          
167. Duerson v. Nat’l Football League, Inc., No. 12 C 2513, 2012 WL 1658353, at *11 
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the plaintiffs’ wrongful death claim was based solely on common law tort 
principles, or if they needed the interpretation of the CBA to be resolved.171  
The court concluded that the plaintiff’s wrongful death claim was preempted 
by section 301 of the LMRA because “resolution of that claim is substan-
tially dependent on, and inextricably intertwined with, an analysis of certain 
provisions of the CBA.”172  Here, it would also be necessary to interpret the 
provisions in the CBA to determine whether the plaintiffs can continue with 
their claims. 
One instance in Dent where the plaintiffs’ claim requires interpretation 
of the CBA is when the plaintiffs allege that the NFL itself is the cause of 
the plaintiffs’ problems, not individual teams.173  For example, they claim 
that NFL doctors and trainers gave players medications without advising 
them on what they were taking.174  However, the NFL has clearly addressed 
the problem of medical care in the CBAs.  For example, the 1993 CBA im-
posed a right to medical care for injuries and placed the scope of that care in 
the hands of team doctors.175 
In Williams, the court found that “the question of whether the Players 
can show that they reasonably relied on the lack of a warning that [the dietary 
supplements] contained bumetanide cannot be ascertained apart from the 
terms of the policy, specifically section eight, entitled ‘Masking Agents and 
Supplements’ and Appendix G, entitled ‘Supplements.’”176  Similar to this 
situation in Williams, here it would be necessary to interpret the CBA provi-
sions on the disclosure of medical information to determine whether plain-
tiffs reasonably relied on the alleged lack of proper disclosure by the NFL. 
This example follows the two-step test for section 301 preemption.  
Even if this state-law tort claim does not directly arise from the CBA, it nev-
ertheless requires the interpretation of the CBA because the CBA includes 
provisions that address the claims. Because the plaintiffs’ claims either arise 
from the CBA, or the CBA can be used to interpret the claims, the plaintiffs’ 
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claims should be preempted under section 301, and the Ninth Circuit erred 
in reversing the trial court’s decision. 
2. The Ninth Circuit’s Holding that the Plaintiff’s Claims are not 
Preempted Under Section 301 Interferes with the Uniformity of 
Interpretation of Collective Bargaining Agreements 
For the players to argue that the NFL has not addressed issues involving 
their health and safety in any of the CBAs is unfair to not only the league, 
but to other employers who also heavily rely on collective bargaining.  As 
mentioned in Section II, Congress’s purpose for passing the LMRA was “to 
prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees and employers in their re-
lations . . . [and] to protect the rights of individual employees in their rela-
tions with labor organizations whose activities affect commerce.”177  In ad-
dition, the purpose of section 301 preemption is to encourage “uniformity of 
interpretation of collective bargaining agreements and prevention of inter-
ference with those agreements.”178  Without either of these, collective bar-
gaining serves no legitimate purpose.179  “To address threats to the federal 
labor-contract scheme, the Supreme Court has fashioned the  [section] 301 
preemption rule such that if state law attempts to define the terms of a col-
lective bargaining agreement, federal labor law preempts that state-law 
claim.”180 
With the Ninth Circuit’s holding, the uniformity of interpretation of 
CBAs is greatly affected, because after the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, procedures 
in the CBAs will be interfered with and plaintiffs will be encouraged to go 
around the CBA.  Similar to the situation in Williams, where the court ruled 
that some of the players’ claims were not preempted by section 301, here the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision that the plaintiff’s claims are not preempted by sec-
tion 301 “threatens the competitive balance by which the NFL is character-
ized, and–on a larger scale–strips employers of their power to collectively 
bargain with employees[,]”181 because it leaves employers who rely on a 
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CBA such as the NFL vulnerable, “with no outlet to ensure its policies are 
uniformly enforced at all levels and locations.”182 
The purpose of the provisions in a CBA are to “enforce a single, uni-
form standard of player conduct to ensure an even playing field for all play-
ers.”183  Allowing the retired players’ claims in Dent to be heard is unjust to 
players from states whose statutes would not protect them.  Consequently, 
the NFL will have a hard time enforcing policies in a CBA in future situa-
tions similar to Dent because players will attempt to follow their respective 
states’ statutes instead.  If the Supreme Court upholds the Ninth Circuit’s 
ruling, the holding in Dent may extend beyond the NFL to employers outside 
of professional sports leagues who rely on a CBA in their negotiations.  With 
the Ninth Circuit’s decision to disregard the provisions in the CBA, employ-
ers from all over the country will now be forced to consult every state’s 
workplace laws where they have employees, along with all other applicable 
statutes, when negotiating their policies.184  This will leave employers frus-
trated and feeling as if they are denied their power to negotiate.185  For this 
reason, it would be more equitable for not only the league, but also for other 
employers and the NFL’s other players, if the Ninth Circuit’s decision was 
overturned. 
B. Possible Solution for Players 
Assuming the Supreme Court overturns the Ninth Circuit’s decision 
and rules in favor of the NFL, the players can then follow the provisions that 
are set out in the CBA and file grievances to be settled through arbitration.  
Not only does the Ninth Circuit’s decision make employers feel as if their 
power to negotiate with employees has been stripped, but it also downplays 
the importance of arbitration, which is “the most widely used dispute reso-
lution mechanism in unionized industries.”186  Any given CBA set forth the 
procedures for initiating and filing a grievance.  For example, Article 15 of 
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the 2011 CBA states that “[t]he System Arbitrator shall make findings of fact 
and determinations of relief including, without limitation, damages…injunc-
tive relief, fines, and specific performance.”187   
In addition, “arbitrators have liberally construed [the] statute of limita-
tions by allowing many complaints to proceed through the system regardless 
of the time of occurrence and filing.”188  In negotiating these provisions, it is 
clear that the NFL’s representatives and the NFLPA intended for disputes to 
be handled through arbitration.  If the Supreme Court does not overturn the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision, employers who negotiated a CBA are left question-
ing the effectiveness of including an arbitration clause.   
An example of a grievance that has recently gone through the NFL’s 
arbitration process involves current free-agent quarterback Colin Kaeper-
nick.189  Kaepernick filed a grievance under the 2011 CBA against NFL own-
ers for collusion, claiming that the NFL and its owners “have colluded to 
deprive Mr. Kaepernick of employment rights . . . .”190  In August of 2018, 
the arbitrator hearing Kaepernick’s case ruled against the league after the 
NFL moved to dismiss the case on the grounds that Kaepernick and his legal 
team had not presented sufficient evidence to proceed.191  This meant that 
Kaepernick was able to continue with his collusion grievance and proceed to 
a hearing with the arbitrator.192  In February of 2019, however, Kaeper-
nick instead reached a settlement with the NFL.193 
Arbitration is especially valuable and must be respected in professional 
sports due to the “availability of a timely resolution, the ability of parties to 
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rely on the finality of the decision, and the arbitrator’s specialized knowledge 
of league rules and customs.”194  Furthermore, the Supreme Court has repeat-
edly encouraged courts to respect and refer to arbitration decisions.195  This 
process may initially seem unfair to the plaintiffs in Dent, because although 
NFL owners, coaches and executives will likely face more intense question-
ing and cross-examinations from the arbitrator,196 there will be less public 
exposure due to the private nature of arbitrations.197  However, these proce-
dures merely follow what the players and the NFL’s Management Council 
agreed upon in a CBA. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Football is a rough, and at times, dangerous sport.  NFL players work 
long hours, put their bodies through a great deal of stress and harm, and are 
at risk for serious career and life-threatening injuries.  For example, recent 
studies have shown that playing professional football may increase the risk 
of neurological problems, premature death, and suffering from brain dis-
ease.198  Given the intensity of their workloads and the stress they put on their 
bodies and minds on a daily basis, it is only natural that NFL players are 
concerned about the steps taken to address their health and safety.  The NFL 
should, and does, address these concerns by imposing duties on individual 
teams through the CBA, the provisions of which address the plaintiffs’ 
claims in Dent. 
This is precisely why the state-law claims brought against the NFL by 
former professional football players in Dent should be preempted by section 
301 of the LMRA.  The Ninth Circuit’s decision to allow the players’ case 
to proceed may leave employers, such as the NFL, with no way to ensure 
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that the provisions collectively agreed upon in the CBA are enforced.  This 
ultimately will interfere with the uniformity of interpretation of any given 
CBA.  Resolution of this preemption question may not only determine the 
future of provisions in CBAs in professional football, but also may impact 
the future of collective bargaining provisions in professional sports overall.  
The Supreme Court should overturn the Ninth Circuit’s decision to ensure 
that the procedures set forth in the NFL’s current (and future) CBA are care-
fully followed. 
 
